Messing Around with the 1987 Bill James Abstract

Last November, Sheenie and I were in Duluth for a wedding and wandered around town.  We stumbled upon an antique store that had a massive collection of books on the second floor.  Eventually, we ended up leaving with about $40 in books (which mean about fifteen books).  Among the ones I snagged was The Bill James Baseball Abstract 1987.  I slowly flipped through it in recent months and found a few items particularly interesting.

First, in writing about the 1986 St. Louis Cardinals who had stumbled to a 79-82 record the year after narrowly losing the World Series, he was skeptical about their chances to bounce right back into contention.  (Obviously, he ultimately was proven wrong.)  His explanation made a lot of sense and were particularly fitting for the 2012 Twins trying to undue the disaster of last year.  He wrote:

Some will argue that if the Cardinals can go from 101 wins to 79 in one season, it must be possible for them to get back to 101 in one more season.  Maybe, but if a man is thrown from a horse in a half-second, does that mean that he must be able to get back on in another?  If you wrap your car around a tree, can you put it back together as quickly?  It is a rule of nature that the processes of destruction, such as fire and violence, act more quickly than the processes of growth and development.

I think it's time Billy Smith starts getting known as The Process of Destruction.

Here's the very first sentence James wrote in his section on the Twins: "In contrast to the comic ineptitude of Hawk Harrelson, with his ridiculous clothes and mock profound pronouncements, there is something sad, something almost sinister about the ineptitude which guides the Minnesota Twins."  Seriously, he wrote that passage about Hawk twenty-five years ago.  James then suggested the Twins would "win quickly" from acquiring one of three men: Whitey Herzog, Lou Gorman, or Joe Carter.  He explained the Twins struggled with racism within its front office and said, "The Twins' problem is that they're a collection of smooth-faced suburban kids with no instinct for the jugular."  Holy crap, that actually sounds like the type of situation Dan Gladden would have fixed.

James also evaluated the 1986 rookie crop extensively because even after one year it was already being proclaimed as one of the best of all time.  He rated the top 1986 rookie performances as: Todd Worrell, Mark Eichhorn, Jose Canseco, Wally Joyner, Robby Thompson, Pete Incaviglia, Danny Tartabull, Cory Snyder, Bruce Rubbin, and Kevin Mitchell.  That list doesn't even include: Barry Bonds, Jamie Moyer, Barry Larkin, Will Clark, Bobby Bonilla, Ruben Sierra, Chuck Finley, Doug Drabek, Dan Plesac, or John Kruk.  That's a pretty spectacular group of rookies.

However, the part that interested me the most was his career projections for current players.  For some reason, he listed his career projections for all the Twins specifically.

PlayerGABRH2B3BHRRBIBB BA
Puckett projected2143848013902588394782361123512.305
Puckett actual1783724410712304414572071085450.318
Hrbek projected1932682410441915353222921110811.281
Hrbek actual 174761929031749312182931086838.282
Brunansky projected18816680886167631722308991728.251
Brunansky actual18006289804154330633271919770.245
Gaetti projected17496072834157631415242891504.260
Gaetti actual2507895111302280443393601341634.255
Smalley projected18936167821156126327183765853.253
Smalley actual16535657745145424425163694771.257
Salas projected1197339038990414040100432239.267
Salas actual509129214231949103814389.247
Gagne projected124134624278541663675375252.247
Gagne actual17985673712144029050111604367.254
Hatcher projected90428453068011471730297138.281
Hatcher actual113033773489461722038375164.280
Bush projected81121502805321162661277218.247
Bush actual121930453887631542696409348.251
Laudner projected823210823547599282275215.225
Laudner actual734203822145897577263190.225
Lombardozzi projected7041891241464871931174218.246
Lombardozzi actual4461264153294611220107131.233

Well look at those projections for Hrbek.  Looks like it expected him to stick around for another year or two, but he completely nailed those final numbers for homers, RBIs, walks, and batting average.  He also pretty much had Laudner's career pegged.  He overestimated Lombardozzi and Mark Salas and underestimated Gagne and Gaetti.  Not a bad projection for Kirby considering he made it when Kirby had just hit 31 homers in 1986 despite having just four career homers in 1200+ plate appearances entering the season.

He didn't list projected career numbers for anyone else, but he did list likelihood of reaching certain milestone accomplishments.  Here are some interesting ones:

Don Mattingly had a 84% chance of 2,000 hits (check!), 64% of 2,500 (nope), and a 4% chance of 4,500 (whoops).  He also had a 82% chance of 300 career homers (nope).  Mattingly fell off a cliff right when I really started following baseball so I am unable to remember just how good he was in the mid-1980s.

Keith Hernandez had a 77% chance of 2,500 hits (nope).  Those NY first basemen really just fizzled up in a hurry.

Wade Boggs only had a 27% chance of 3,000 hits (barely got there).  That made me look up his Baseball-Reference page.  What in the world was Boston doing with him?  He hit over .300 in AA as a 20 year-old so they . . . make him repeat AA?!  Then, they finally promote him after two years of hitting .300 at AA, he hits .300 at AAA.  So they make him repeat it again?!  What was that all about?

George Bell had a 61% chance of 2,000 hits (nope), a 68% chance of 300 homers (nope), a 21% chance of 1500 RBIs (nope).  Another guy who fizzled out.

Tim Raines had a 75% chance of 938 career stolen bases (Lou Brock's record).  He didn't quite make it.  In fact, James gave him a 2% chance of 1600 career steals.  He also had a 45% chance of 1500 runs and did make that.

Rickey, on the other hand, was given a 6% chance of 1800 career steals.  He ended up with 1406, and he was given a 36% chance at 1400.  Oh, he had a 90% chance at the career steals record by 1987.  He also had a 48% chance at 300 homers and ended up hitting 297.  Strangely (because he was always going to be limited as a leadoff guy, James projected him with a 90% chance of 1500 RBIs and he fell far short of that total.

Ok, I lied.  He posted projected statistics for a couple other players:

PlayerGABRH2B3BHRRBIBB BA
George Brett projected2803101801682309364113133115541284.304
George Brett actual270710349153315466513731715961096.305
Mike Schmidt projected28569673178425734686462118051719.266
Mike Schmidt actual24048352150622344085954815951507.267
Buddy Bell projected2683968712842674470592181179933.276
Buddy Bell actual2405899511512514425562011106836.279

Anyway, if you're ever browsing through a used bookstore or an antique store and come across some old Bill James stuff, I highly recommend buying it.  It was interesting to go back and get a snapshot in time of Spring Training 1987 and the thinking in baseball at the time.

24 thoughts on “Messing Around with the 1987 Bill James Abstract”

  1. Cool stuff, Pirate. Those 1980s Abstracts completely changed the way I looked at baseball.

    Was this written during the time Harrelson was the White Sox' GM?

    1. Was this written during the time Harrelson was the White Sox' GM?
      Looks like it. He was the GM for the 1986 season. From The Repository:

      During his one season as GM, Harrelson fired field manager Tony LaRussa (who was soon hired by the Oakland Athletics) and assistant general manager Dave Dombrowski (who became baseball's youngest general manager with the Montreal Expos just two years later). Harrelson also traded rookie Bobby Bonilla, later a six-time All-Star, to the Pittsburgh Pirates for pitcher Jose DeLeon.

      1. That's one heckuva legacy. I wonder if he also designed the uniforms with the shorts and the big lapels.

        1. I believe that was Bill Veeck. Veeck had some great ideas, but when he came up with a bad one, it was a doozy.

    2. Yes, the Twins section followed the White Sox section in which he just eviscerated Hawk. Here's the rundown on the ways Hawk apparently was a disaster (AT THE TIME, not in hindsight):
      1) He moved the fences at Old Comiskey back because he claimed he was building a team built on speed and defense. This team featured Harold Baines, Ron Kittle, Carlton Fisk, and Greg Walker: all slow and powerful hitters.
      2) Despite this, Hawk released Rudy Law (the only outfielder even capable of faking CF on the team and despite Tony LaRussa imploring him not to) and installing John Cangelosi in CF (who would put together an OPS+ of 76 and, despite being only 23 years old and lasting in the Majors for thirteen more years, would never come within 200 plate appearances of his season total again).
      3) Additionally, Hawk presided over the decision to move Fisk, at thirty-eight years old, to left field full time to get Joel Skinner's bat in the lineup. Apparently, no one ever took credit for the move, but it was attributed to Hawk, LaRussa, and Dave Duncan at various times (Duncan supposedly didn't like the way Fisk called pitches). James sums the move up perfectly:

      [B]efore making this move the White Sox had:
      1) One of the league's best offensive and defensive catchers in Carlton Fisk, who had hit 37 homers and driven in 107 runs in 1985; and
      2) A slow, slugging right-handed hitting left fielder/DH named Ron Kittle.
      After making this move, the White Sox had:
      1) No proven catcher;
      2) Two slow, slugging right-handed hitting left fiedler/DHs, and as a special bonus:
      3) One very unhappy veteran player, who just coincidentally had been the team MVP in two of the previous three years.

      4) Every trade Hawk made (besides trading Britt Burns who was too injured to ever pitch again - which infuriated the Yankees who had traded for damaged goods) hurt the White Sox. Here's the WAR for his trades:

      Players traded future WAR
      Ed Correa 1.2
      Scott Fletcher 22.1
      Jose Mota -0.2
      Britt Burns 0.0
      Ron Hassey 1.5
      Matt Winters -0.7
      Scott Bradley -1.4
      Tom Seaver 1.8
      Al Jones 0.0
      Bobby Bonilla 26.7
      Ron Kittle 2.1
      Wayne Tolleson 0.7
      Joel Skinner -0.4
      Total 53.4
      Players received future WAR
      Dave Schmidt 1.9
      Wayne Tolleson 0.9
      Ron Hassey 2.6
      Joe Cowley 0.2
      Neil Allen 2.4
      Scott Bradley -0.1
      Ivan Calderon 10.0
      Steve Lyons 1.5
      Ray Searage 2.6
      Jose DeLeon 12.3
      Carlos Martinez -3.1
      Pete Filson -0.7
      Total 30.5

      Ron Hassey's total is confusing because Hawk traded for him in the offseason. Then traded him away during the same offseason. Then traded for him again at the next trade deadline. Bizarre, right? Likewise, Scott Bradley's total in the bottom column was that he accumulated while with the White Sox. The top column is his total after he was traded away again by Hawk. Apparently, Hawk loved trading left-handed hitting catchers. Good thing he didn't have access to Joe Mauer.

      Anyway, it's pretty clear that while Bobby Bonilla was his worst decision (although DeLeon wasn't a terrible return), he was not making the team better despite making a ridiculous number of trades in just one year at the helm.

      So, in short, the White Sox chapter was pretty hilarious.

      1. Carlton Fisk's second worst offensive year was his second to last, at age 44. His worst? 1986 where he was twenty runs worse than when he was 44, six years later.

  2. What in the world was Boston doing with him? He hit over .300 in AA as a 20 year-old so they . . . make him repeat AA?! Then, they finally promote him after two years of hitting .300 at AA, he hits .300 at AAA. So they make him repeat it again?! What was that all about?

    I believe Boggs wasn't a very good defender early on. He didn't hit for a lot of power and was slow on the basepaths, so all he had was his high average to offer. Plus, GMs of the time didn't appreciate walks as much as they do now, especially in Boston.

  3. One other crazy thing I discovered was just how amazing Eric Davis was. His peak occurred a little too early and in the wrong league for me to remember, but my goodness...27 homers and 80 steals in just 132 games in 1986?! That's beyond silly. Oh, and he was only caught stealing 11 times. The next year he hit 37 homers, but stole just 50 bases while being caught 6 times in 129 games.

    1. In 1986, Davis finished 12th on the NL MVP ballot. 1987 season, he finish 9th on the NL MVP ballot.

      1. He was 6th in rWAR among NL position players in 1986 at 5.0 (Tony Gwynn was first at 6.4). In 1987, Davis was second in NL rWAR at 7.7 (Gwynn was first at 8.3).

        Gwynn finished 9th and 8th, respectively, in NL MVP voting those two seasons (despite hitting a ridiculous 370/447/511 in 1987).

        1. How did he never finish above third in the MVP balloting? Video Game-esque batting averages, gold gloves, and steals by a universally loved player.

            1. And HRs. That seems to be the reason he lost to Mike Schmidt and Andre Dawson in '86 and '87 respectively.

          1. I don't recall Eric Davis as a universally loved player. Memory is a funny thing, but my recollection is that in many people's eyes, he was a disappointment no matter what he did because he wasn't the next Willie Mays, like he was supposed to be.

                1. Ironically, I also discovered that Tony Gwynn was not universally beloved while reading another antique shop Bill James book (possible rundown forthcoming a month or two from now). Apparently he sniped at his teammates throughout the 1990 season so much that it became a huge negative. (After 1986, BTW, James gave him a 28% chance at 3,000 hits.)

                  1. From The Baseball Book 1991 it runs down Gwynn's problems. Apparently they festered for two seasons. In 1989, he complained about moaned about being underpaid all season.

                    In mid-May [of 1990] Mike Pagliarulo told a New York writer about an unnamed teammate. "If we win and he goes 0 for 4, forget it," said Pagliarulo. "He's ticked. If he gets his hits and we lose, that's fine with him. He doesn't give a damn about this team, and that's weak."

                    Sports Illustrated then reported that Gwynn was blasted in a players-only clubhouse meeting primarily by Jack Clark and Garry Templeton for caring more about his batting average than winning.

                    On September 8, 1990, "Gwynn found a toy figurine of himself . . . hanging by a chain in the Padres' dugout." The Sporting News reported:

                    Before the figurine was discarded, Gwynn asked a photographer to take a picture of it. He then hung the photo in his locker. "I want it there so people who didn't see it can see what it looked like," Gwynn said. "I know I'm never going to forget about it."

                    A week later, Gwynn broke a finger on a defensive play knocking him out for the rest of the season. He promptly cleaned out his locker and went home rather than remaining with the team at all.

Comments are closed.